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There are few areas of law that grant judges as much discretion as the sentencing of 
criminal offenders. This discretion necessarily leads to concerns about the influence of 
biases, including those that result from subconscious processes associated with human 
cognition; that is to say, heuristics. In this article, the authors explore one heuristic—number 
preference—through an examination of all reported second degree murder parole ineligi-
bility decisions between 1990 and 2012. Number preference leads individuals to predictably 
round off measurements to certain favoured numbers. The authors identify a tendency for 
parole ineligibility decisions to cluster around even numbers and multiples of five, without 
any obvious, legally-justifiable reason for such rounding. The authors propose that the 
phenomenon should cause concern not least because it suggests that other, less easily 
measurable but no less powerful, heuristics may also be at work in judicial decisions.
Peu de secteurs juridiques donnent aux juges autant de latitude pour exprimer leur pouvoir 
discrétionnaire que la condamnation des criminels. Ce pouvoir discrétionnaire entraîne 
nécessairement des inquiétudes relativement à l’influence de préjugés, y compris ceux qui 
découlent des mécanismes subconscients associés aux processus cognitifs, autrement 
dit l’heuristique. Les auteurs de cet article étudient un processus heuristique partic-
ulier—la préférence pour des chiffres particuliers—en analysant tous les verdicts connus 
d’inadmissibilité à la libération sur parole de coupables de meurtre au second degré entre 
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1990 et 2012. La préférence pour des chiffres particuliers porte des personnes à arrondir de 
manière prévisible des montants à certaines valeurs privilégiées. Les auteurs ont remarqué 
une tendance à arrondir, sans raison évidente juridiquement justifiable, à des nombres pairs 
et des multiples de cinq la durée des périodes d’inadmissibilité à la libération sur parole. Les 
auteurs signalent que ce phénomène devrait susciter des inquiétudes, en particulier parce 
qu’il permet de croire que d’autres processus heuristiques, moins facilement mesurables 
mais tout aussi puissants, pourraient influencer des décisions judiciaires.
JUDGES COMMONLY SAY THAT SENTENCING CRIMINAL OFFENDERS is more of 
an art than a science.1 What they seem to mean is that crafting a sentence involves 
the exercise of a broad discretion to apply criteria that are not readily definable. 
The sentencing judge’s relative freedom is not only codified in the guidelines for 
sentencing set out in the Criminal Code (Code),2 but also assiduously fostered 
through deference shown to sentencing decisions by appellate courts.3 Indeed, 
while most would agree that virtually all legal decisions permit the judge at least 
some latitude, sentencing decisions must surely rank among the most discre-
tionary made in the Canadian criminal justice system.
1. See e.g. R v Arganda (JR), 2011 MBCA 54 at para 38, 268 Man R (2d) 194; R v Sharpe 
(KD), 2009 MBCA 50 at para 49, 240 Man R (2d) 52; R v Biln, 1999 BCCA 369 at para 
17, 125 BCAC 254; R v Crowell (1992), 114 NSR (2d) 355, 1992 CanLII 2506 (CA).
2. RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 718, 718.1 [Criminal Code]. 
3. R v Shropshire, [1995] 4 SCR 227, 129 DLR (4th) 657 [Shropshire]; R v M (CA), [1996] 1 
SCR 500 at para 90, 182 AR 30; R v Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13 at para 38, [2012] 1 SCR 433.
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The presence of such a broad discretion necessarily leads to concerns over 
bias: the more legal latitude a judge has, the more room he or she has to take 
into account considerations other than those which might legitimately inform a 
judge’s reasons. Most of the concern over the biased exercise of judicial judgment 
in Canada has focused on social, cultural, or political predispositions towards 
members of a group, or to the predispositions of individual judges.4 This is the 
type of bias that has fixated legal scholars since the heyday of Legal Realism in the 
early part of the twentieth century.5 
But a question that has received much less attention until recently is the 
extent to which judicial decisions may be systematically influenced by subcon-
scious processes associated with human cognition—that is to say, biases that 
result from innate cognitive functions known as “heuristics.”6 If it is true that 
opportunities for the exercise of bias increase with the amount of discretion 
involved in any given decision, the relatively higher level of discretion enjoyed by 
sentencing judges should make their decisions a valuable source of data in which 
these heuristics and the resulting biases might be detected and explored.  
4. See e.g. James Stribopoulos & Moin A Yahya, “Does a Judge’s Party of Appointment or 
Gender Matter to Case Outcomes? An Empirical Study of the Court of Appeal for Ontario” 
(2007) 45:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 315 (arguing that the political party that appointed the 
judge and the judge’s gender are statistically significant variables in explaining outcomes 
in legal proceedings); Sean Rehaag, “The Luck of the Draw? Judicial Review of Refugee 
Determinations in the Federal Court of Canada (2005-2010)” (2012) 8:3 Osgoode 
CLPE Research Paper Series Working Paper No 9/2012, online: <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2027517> (noting that outcomes in judicial review applications in Canada’s Federal 
Court show that they turn more on the judge assigned to an application than on its merits).
5. Legal Realists such as Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank argued that legal maxims could be 
invoked to support almost any desired outcome, and that therefore a judge’s predilections—
political, social, moral, religious, and racial—would be the invisible forces that could decide 
individual cases. See generally Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction 
to Legal Reasoning (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009) at 129-35.
6. Deborah W Denno, “Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology, and the Criminal Justice 
System: Introduction” (2010) 8:1 Ohio St J Crim L 1 at 1-6. For an overview of research 
into heuristics in the courtroom setting, see Craig E Jones, “The Troubling New Science 
of Legal Persuasion: Heuristics and Biases in Judicial Decision-Making” (2013) 41 Adv Q 
49; The Honourable Mr Justice Todd L Archibald & Shannon SW O’Connor, “Cognitive 
Psychology in the Courtroom: The Art and Science of Persuasion – Chapter II” (2012) 
Ann Rev Civ Litigation.
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To date, there has been relatively little research done on heuristics and biases 
in the context of sentencing.7 One reason for this may be that it is difficult to 
gain access to judges in order to perform experiments, either because of the time 
commitment involved or because judges are reluctant to assist with experiments 
proving the presence of sub-rational decision-making in the exercise of judicial 
discretion.8 However, if a heuristic produces a systemic bias favouring a particular 
outcome, it might be possible to glean from the public records a pattern of 
decisions revealing that bias. While this type of study does not have the rigour of 
a laboratory setting with control groups,9 it can help identify systemic patterns 
within the matrix of decisions and offer insights that may prompt further study 
and experimental inquiry.10 
7. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J Rachlinski & Andrew J Wistrich, “Inside the Judicial Mind” (2001) 
86:4 Cornell L Rev 777 at 781-82 (noting a paucity of research in this area). While there has 
been some research on judges and heuristics, and indeed some discussion of bias in judicial 
decision-making even by judges themselves (Guthrie’s frequent collaborator Andrew Wistrich 
is himself a judge, as is Todd Archibald, cited in supra note 6), most of this work has been 
done in the context of lab studies with hypotheticals. This article attempts to use real-world 
data to test whether and how a heuristic may be influencing judicial decisions.
8. Typically, cognitive neuroscience tests subjects using short scenarios, but more realistic 
experiments involve “experimental games” in which two or more persons are brought 
together to take part in elaborate situations. See e.g. John M Darley, “Citizens’ Assignments 
of Punishments for Moral Transgressions: A Case Study in the Psychology of Punishment” 
(2010) 8:1 Ohio St J Crim L 101 at 106, 116, 102-103.
9. Courts have generally been reluctant to accept that statistical indicators are sufficient to prove 
bias in judicial decisions, at least in the traditional sense of “prejudice.” See e.g. Es-Sayyid 
v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FCA 59, [2012] 4 
FCR 3. The difficulty in addressing the effects of bias in the context of highly discretionary 
decisions is that the bias, and its source, will be completely invisible in any particular case 
and observable only when a large number of similar cases are observed in the aggregate.
10. As with a famous recent study of the Israeli parole court system, which revealed that a 
prisoner’s chance for parole depended heavily on the time of day at which he appeared before 
the decision maker, the fact that one’s chance of parole went from nearly 65 per cent first 
thing in the morning to less than 10 per cent at the end of the day (with a spike after lunch) 
was posited to be an indication of a known heuristic called “decision fatigue,” which tends to 
make our decisions more conservative and status quo-biased as a busy day wears on. See Shai 
Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Loira Avnaim-Pesso, “Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions” 
(2011) 108:17 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 6889.
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We advance just such an analysis in this article. We examine whether one 
heuristic—“number preference”11—can be observed from reported decisions 
concerning parole ineligibility for persons convicted of second-degree murder. 
Number preference is a human tendency to select favoured numbers. It leads 
us to systemically and predictably round off measurements to the nearest such 
number, sacrificing accuracy in the service of conserving mental energy and 
cognitive space. Could judges imposing sentences fall prey to this tendency? 
Based on a review of substantially all of the reported second-degree murder 
sentencing decisions between 1990 and 2012, we have identified a clear tendency 
for judicial decisions to cluster around certain numbers without any apparent 
legal reason.12 It is perhaps not surprising that judges may be rounding periods of 
parole ineligibility to the nearest whole number (2 or 3 instead of 2.25 or 3.5).13 
However, our examination of the data suggests that parole ineligibility periods 
are also strongly influenced by a preference for multiples of five (10, 15, 20, and 
25) and, perhaps most striking of all, for even numbers over odd. If the rounding 
effect is real, it means that many months, and in some cases years, are being added 
to (or subtracted from) sentences for no reason other than unacknowledged (and, 
in all likelihood, subconscious) preference for certain numbers over others.
We suggest that there is no obvious, legally justifiable reason for the 
rounding that is apparent in the data, and we propose that the phenomenon 
should cause concern both in its own right (because we argue that accuracy in 
judicial decisions is inherently valuable), and also because it suggests that other, 
less easily measurable but no less powerful heuristics may also be at work in 
such decisions. In the United States, it has been observed that sentencing rules 
do not “account for the effects of cognitive biases when establishing sentencing 
11. It might be debated the extent to which number preferences are true heuristics, and indeed 
there is little agreement on what the term includes. We are not suggesting here that a 
preference for a particular number (such as five or eight) is itself biologically evolved (though 
we do not rule that out, either). Whether the source of a preference for a given number is 
innate or learned, however, one thing seems clear: we do have a shared tendency to deviate 
towards preferred numbers, however it is imprinted on our minds.
12. The database—of almost five hundred decisions over those twenty-two years—had been 
assembled with another purpose in mind: to examine the effect of changes in the sentencing 
law for second-degree murder cases. The clustering of the numbers it revealed, and the 
strength of the effect, were a surprise.
13. See Richard H Thaler, “Mental Accounting Matters” (1999) 12 J Behav Dec Making 183 at 
185. Thaler asserts that this rounding to whole numbers may simply be a function of a kind 
of “mental accounting,” that is to say, the shorthand process that people use at a sub-rational 
level to code, categorize, or evaluate numerical outcomes.
(2014) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL114
procedures.”14 The same is true in Canada. We propose that judges and policy-
makers should become aware of these sub-rational influences and attempt to 
counter them through more rigorous and objective analysis of individual cases.
I.  HEURISTICS AND BIASES IN DECISION MAKING
A. HEURISTIC DECISION-MAKING
Cognitive neuroscience has firmly established the existence of “heuristics”: 
decision-making shortcuts that are used as fast and frugal alternatives to delibera-
tive and rational processes.15 The term heuristic was first coined in the 1950s and 
originally referred to a technique of using mathematical shortcuts to produce 
sufficiently accurate results for a given purpose.16 Such mathematical heuristics 
were frequently used to allow the cruder and more limited computers of the day 
to apply rules which are right enough, enough of the time, to make the rules 
worth applying instead of more laborious, resource intensive algorithms which 
may produce greater accuracy but which also come at a greater cost in terms of 
speed and resource consumption. 
In the 1970s, the concept of a heuristic was adapted and extended to the 
field of psychology by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky.17 Kahneman and 
Tversky’s theory was that in conditions of uncertainty, the human brain relies 
extensively upon simple cognitive processes that permit it to make rough-and-
ready decisions which, in general, work out sufficiently well to be a positive 
adaptation.18 In effect, people employ heuristics to “reduce the complex tasks of 
assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations.”19 
However, as Mark Kelman explains, “[c]ognitive capacities that served us well, or 
well enough, in most of the circumstances we confronted in the hunter-gatherer 
environment in which they evolved may serve us more poorly in modern life 
where environmental conditions may differ.”20 
14. Daniel M Isaacs, “Baseline Framing in Sentencing” (2011) 121:2 Yale LJ 426 at 428.
15. For a comprehensive description of the present state of research into the effects of heuristics 
on judicial decisions, see Jones, supra note 6.
16. George Polya, How To Solve It: A New Aspect of Mathematical Method, 2d ed (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1957). The word “heuristic” in fact derives from the Greek verb 
heuriskein (euriskein), which means “to find.”
17. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, “Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” 
(1974) 185:4157 Science 1124 at 1124-1131.
18. Ibid at 1124. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Mark Kelman, The Heuristics Debate (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 13.
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To understand the significance of Kahneman and Tversky’s work, something 
more should be said about neuroscience’s model of judgment and decision 
making more generally. Most cognitive neuroscientists divide human decision-
making processes into two systems: the intuitive system (often called System 1) 
and the deliberative system (System 2).21 The intuitive system is characterized 
by rapid decision-making processes that involve a high degree of automaticity 
and low degrees of effort, awareness, and conscious control. Heuristics are an 
important part of this System 1. The deliberative System 2, on the other hand, 
is characterized by the opposite qualities: It is relatively slower, less rule-based, 
and involves a higher degree of conscious awareness. Since approximately 95 per 
cent of brain activity is subconscious, many of our day-to-day decisions still rely 
upon our System 1. However, especially for present purposes, it is important to 
emphasize that the deliberative System 2 is able to override decisions made by the 
institutive system, where it recognizes System 1’s errors and where it is motivated 
to correct them.22 
B. PREVIOUS EVIDENCE OF BIASES IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON QUANTITY
Many heuristics have been measured in human subjects. One of the earliest 
documented is the so-called “anchoring” effect, first postulated by Kahneman 
and Tversky in 1974.23 Anchoring means that subjects who are asked to choose 
a number will tend to be influenced by a number previously shown them, even 
if the two are (or should be) clearly unrelated. “Priming” a subject in this way 
has been shown to significantly affect estimates of everything from the age at 
which Mahatma Ghandi died to the price of real estate.24 The effect of anchoring 
is so profound that individuals who have seen an anchoring number for only 
21. Steven A Sloman, “The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning” (1996) 119:1 
Psychological Bulletin 3 at 6.
22. Daniel T Gilbert, “Inferential Correction” in Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel 
Kahneman, eds, Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 167 at 167 (“[O]ne of psychology’s fundamental 
insights is that judgments are generally the products of nonconscious systems that operate 
quickly, on the basis of scant evidence, and in a routine manner, and then pass their hurried 
approximations to consciousness, which slowly and deliberately adjusts them.”) Gilbert’s 
“inferential correction” approach was applied in the judicial context by Guthrie and his 
colleagues in their proposal of an “intuitive-override model of judging.” See Chris Guthrie, 
Jeffrey J Rachlinski & Andrew J Wistrich, “Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide 
Cases” (2007) 93:1 Cornell L Rev 1 at 9.
23.  Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 17 at 1124.
24. Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, “Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect: 
Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility” (1997) 73:3 J Personality & Social Psychology 437.
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three milliseconds have been shown to be influenced when making subsequent 
estimates of the average temperature in Germany, or the price of a used car.25
Studies conducted in the legal context have shown the influence of anchoring 
in a stark way. Early research on juries demonstrated that personal injury verdicts 
could be influenced by previous numbers presented as high demands by plaintiffs 
(even if outlandish, jurors’ verdicts were pulled towards the demand),26 and also, 
ironically, by the provision of information regarding a cap on damages (telling 
jurors of a cap predictably pulled lower awards upwards towards the cap).27 
Judges have also been shown to be susceptible to anchors. In one study, 
United States Federal Court judges were asked to estimate damages based on a 
fact pattern in a personal injury case. Subjects who were told that the plaintiff 
had demanded $10 million at a pre-trial settlement conference assessed a mean 
award of $1.2 million. Those presented with identical facts but who were 
“unaware” of the settlement offer awarded an average of only $808,000.28 The 
effect also has been shown to work in the other direction, in an experiment where 
damage awards were pulled downward from $1.2 million to just $882,000 by the 
defendant’s clearly spurious suggestion that the potential award did not meet the 
minimum federal jurisdictional threshold of $75,000.29 
In the criminal context, a fascinating series of experiments in Germany 
has shown the extent to which judges’ sentencing decisions can be influenced 
by numbers provided by prosecutors30 or by media reporters, and even those 
25. Thomas Mussweiler & Birte Englich, “Subliminal Anchoring: Judgmental Consequences and 
Underlying Mechanisms” (2005) 98 Organizational Behaviour & Human Decision Processes 
133.
26. John Malouff & Nicola S Schutte, “Shaping Juror Attitudes: Effects of Requesting Different 
Damage Amounts in Personal Injury Trials” (1989) 129:4 J Social Psychology 491.
27. So, for instance, in a case where damages will be less than $1 million, a jury told that damages 
are capped at that amount will return a verdict closer to $1 million that a jury who is not 
told of the cap. See Jennifer K Robbennolt & Christina A Studebaker, “Anchoring in the 
Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages” (1999) 23:3 Law & Hum Behav 353.
28. Andrew J Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J Rachlinski, “Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible 
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding” (2005) 153:4 U Pa L Rev 1251.
29. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 7. 
30. Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, “The Last Word in Court – A Hidden 
Disadvantage for the Defense” (2005) 29:6 Law & Hum Behav 705.
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shouted out by members of the gallery.31 But one of the most intriguing studies 
of the influence of subconscious bias on judges in the criminal context is a widely 
publicized study of Israel’s Parole Court by Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav, and 
Loira Avnaim-Pesso. The study examined 1,112 rulings from eight Israeli judges 
over a ten-month period. The study’s authors discovered that about 65 per cent 
of parole applicants were successful at the beginning of the court session (i.e., 
when court began, after the morning break, and after lunch). However, the 
applicants’ rate of success declined with each decision after breaks. The result was 
that judges had a bias towards the status quo (i.e., continued detention) based 
upon their fatigue. While the Danziger study has been criticized for overlooking 
certain variables that might have accounted for part of the downward trend,32 the 
study nevertheless demonstrated that “extraneous variables can influence judicial 
decisions, which bolsters the growing body of evidence that points to the suscep-
tibility of experienced judges to psychological biases.”33   
Anchoring is only one of a number of cognitive weaknesses that might be at 
work in sentencing decisions: a phenomenon called “baseline framing” has been 
suggested as skewing judgments of appropriate sentences,34 and other research 
has demonstrated that judges’ decisions regarding conditional or interim release 
can be influenced by sub-rational factors as diverse as the order of presentation of 
proposed sentences,35 the time of day,36 and even whether the judge had recently 
contemplated his or her own death.37
31. Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, “Playing Dice With Criminal Sentences: 
The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making” (2006) 32:2 
Personality & Social Psychology Bull 188 [Englich, Mussweiler & Strack, “Playing 
Dice”]; Birte Englich, “Blind or Biased? Justitia’s Susceptibility to Anchoring Effects in the 
Courtroom Based on Given Numerical Representations” (2006) 28:4 Law & Pol’y 497; 
Robert A Prentice & Jonathan J Koehler, “A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making” 
(2003) 88:3 Cornell L Rev 583 at 638-39.
32. Karen Weinshall-Margel & John Shapard, “Overlooked Powers in the Analysis of Parole 
Decisions” (2011) 108:42 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences E833. The 
variables overlooked in the Danziger study included that the cases were not necessarily heard 
in a non-random order, that the board tried to complete cases from each institution before it 
took a break, and that unrepresented applicants went last.
33. Danziger, Levav & Avnaim-Pesso, supra note 10 at 6892.
34. Isaacs, supra note 14 at 426.
35. Englich, supra note 31; Englich, Mussweiler & Strack, “Playing Dice,” supra note 31. 
36. Danziger, Levav & Avnaim-Pesso, supra note 10.
37. Adam Rosenblatt et al, “Evidence for Terror Management Theory: I. The Effects of Mortality 
Salience on Reactions to Those Who Violate or Uphold Cultural Values” (1989) 57:4 J 
Personality & Social Psychology 681.
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C. NUMBER PREFERENCE AS A HEURISTIC OR BIAS
This article focuses on one specific heuristic: number preference. Number 
preference, end-digit preference, or simply digit preference, has been defined 
as “a preference for certain numbers that leads to rounding off measurements. 
Rounding off may be to the nearest whole number, even number, [or] multiple 
of 5 or 10… .”38 Number preference is revealed when a particular digit occurs 
more frequently than statistics would suggest it should. For example, a preference 
may be in play when more than 20 per cent of numbers that should be randomly 
distributed end with 0 or 5, or when more than half end with an even number. 
When number preference produces “clusters” of preferred numbers in reported 
data, it is sometimes referred to as “heaping.”
The number preference phenomenon has been measured in various contexts. 
As one might expect, it has been of particular concern in the medical field, where 
inaccuracies in self-reported numbers such as gestational age or weight can lead 
to misdiagnosis and poor treatment outcomes, and in demographics, when 
it can skew policy decisions that rely on reported ages.39 The extent to which 
preferences for particular numbers are innate is uncertain, because the strength 
of the effect appears to vary among countries and among speakers of different 
languages, suggesting a significant cultural component to the selection of the 
favoured digits.40
38. John M Last, ed, A Dictionary of Epidemiology, 3d ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995) at 47.
39. Anita L Stewart, “The Reliability and Validity of Self-Reported Weight and Height” (1982) 
35:4 J Chron Dis 295; Michael L Rowland, “Self-reported weight and height” (1990) 52:6 
Am J Clin Nutr 1125; Tommy LS Visscher et al, “Underreporting of BMI in Adults and 
Its Effect on Obesity Prevalence Estimations in the Period 1998 to 2001” (2006) 14:11 
Obesity 2054; Laura A Schieve et al, “Validity of Self-reported Pregnancy Delivery Weight: 
An Analysis of the 1988 National Maternal and Infant Health Survey” (1999) 150:9 Am J 
Epidemiol 947; S de Lusignan et al, “End-digit preference in blood pressure recordings of 
patients with ischaemic heart disease in primary care” (2004) 18:4 J Human Hypertension 
261; Ansley J Coale & Shaomin Li, “The Effect of Age Misreporting in China on the 
Calculation of Mortality Rates at Very High Ages” (1991) 28:2 Demography 293; L Edouard 
& A Senthilselvan, “Observer error and birthweight: digit preference in recording” (1997) 
111 Public Health 77.
40. Matthias Bopp & David Faeh, “End-digits preference for self-reported height depends on 
language” (2008) 8 BMC Public Health 342. This is not to say that the heuristic itself is a 
cultural artefact, only that its manifestation may vary among different societies.
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II. THE SENTENCING REGIME FOR SECOND-DEGREE 
MURDER
A. THE ORIGIN AND STRUCTURE OF THE PAROLE INELIGIBILITY REGIME
The sentencing regime for second-degree murder in Canada is noteworthy because 
it combines a mandatory minimum sentence (life imprisonment) with a partially 
discretionary period of parole ineligibility of between ten and twenty-five years.41 
It is unique in Canadian law in its combination of mandatory sentencing with 
minimum parole ineligibility. 
The current provisions of the Code on parole ineligibility date from 1976. In 
that year, Parliament eliminated the classification of murder as either “capital” or 
“non-capital,” eliminated the death penalty, and established the present categories 
of first- and second-degree murder.42 Both forms of murder were subject to a 
mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment. However, offenders 
convicted of first-degree murder would be subject to a twenty-five-year period of 
parole ineligibility, whereas those convicted of second-degree murder would be 
given a period of parole ineligibility of between ten and twenty-five years, subject 
to the so-called “faint hope clause.”43 This clause permitted a reduction in the 
parole ineligibility period after an offender had served a period of incarceration 
of fifteen years. 
Although the provisions of the Code do not confer an unfettered discretion 
on a sentencing judge, the open-textured language of section 745.4 plainly grants 
significant discretion. The section provides: 
745.4 Subject to section 745.5, at the time of the sentencing under section 745 of 
an offender who is convicted of second degree murder, the judge who presided at 
the trial of the offender or, if that judge is unable to do so, any judge of the same 
court may, having regard to the character of the offender, the nature of the offence 
and the circumstances surrounding its commission, and to the recommendation, if 
any, made pursuant to section 745.2, by order, substitute for ten years a number of 
41. By contrast, convictions for first-degree murder lead to a mandatory parole ineligibility 
period of 25 years. See Criminal Code, supra note 2, s 745(a). 
42. Criminal Law Amendment (Capital Punishment) Act, SC 1973-74, c 38, s 3. Until the 1960s, 
murder was a capital offence with the only punishment being death. See Criminal Code, SC 
1953-54, c 51, ss 206, 656. In 1961, Parliament introduced amendments to the Criminal 
Code that led to a distinction being made between capital and non-capital murder. See An Act 
to amend the Criminal Code (Capital Murder), SC 1960-61, c 44, s 2.
43. The “faint hope” clause refers to what was formerly s 745.6 of the Criminal Code. It was 
brought into force in 1976 as part of the abolition of capital murder and creation of first- and 
second-degree murder. See Criminal Law Amendment Act (No 2), 1976, SC 1974-76, c 105.
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years of imprisonment (being more than ten but not more than twenty-five) without 
eligibility for parole, as the judge deems fit in the circumstances.44
The discretion conferred on sentencing judges by the Code has been jealously 
guarded in the case law. For example, notwithstanding that a jury recommenda-
tion is listed in section 745.4 as among the factors that a judge must consider, 
appellate courts have held that a sentencing judge can depart from it without 
any reason.45 In keeping with this posture of deference, higher courts have 
given relatively little guidance with respect to appropriate ranges. Although 
certain provincial courts once held that the Code established a rebuttable legal 
presumption of ten years’ parole ineligibility,46 the Supreme Court of Canada 
(SCC) has rejected this interpretation as an unnecessary restriction on judicial 
discretion.47 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the case law is relatively unspecific in terms 
of the factors that would generate a sentence in excess of ten years. The Code 
itself says only that the court must consider (aside from the jury’s recommen-
dation, if any) “the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the 
circumstances surrounding its commission.”48 One province’s appellate court has 
vaguely suggested that there are two main groupings of cases that reflect orders 
of magnitude of moral blameworthiness and/or dangerousness: cases resulting 
in sentences of ten to fifteen years or fifteen to twenty years.49 Factors that 
frequently appear in the cases in support of longer parole ineligibility periods 
include things such as: the presence of multiple murder victims,50 the exploi-
44. Criminal Code, supra note 2, s 745.4.
45. R v Mafi, 2000 BCCA 135, 142 CCC (3d) 449; R v Cruz, [1998] BCJ no 811 (QL) at paras 
44-48, [1999] 1 WWR 322 (CA) [Cruz]; R v Hoang, 2002 BCCA 430 at paras 11-12, 167 
CCC (3d) 218; R v Cerra, 2004 BCCA 594, 192 CCC (3d) 78 [Cerra].
46. R v Brown (1993), 31 BCAC 59, 83 CCC (3d) 394; R v Gourgon (1981), 21 CR (3d) 384, 
58 CCC (2d) 193 (BCCA). Compare R v Doyle (1991), 108 NSR (2d) 1 at 5, 294 APR 1 
(CA); R v Wenarchuk (1982), 67 CCC (2d) 169, 3 WWR 643 (Sask CA).
47. At the same time, in Shropshire, the SCC maintained that “it may well be that, in the median 
number of cases, a period of 10 years might still be awarded.” See Shropshire, supra note 3 at 
para 27.
48. Criminal Code, supra note 2, s 745.4.
49. Cerra, supra note 45.
50. R v Arneil, [1994] BCJ no 2640 (QL), (sub nom R v JJA) 52 BCAC 291; R v Cliff, 2011 
BCSC 1177, 88 CR (6th) 175; R v Turcotte, 2006 BCSC 2087, 79 WCB (2d) 305; R v 
Stewner (1996), 113 Man R (2d) 78, MJ no 444 (QL) (CA).
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tation of vulnerability (e.g., husband/wife, killing of a child or the elderly),51 
facts suggesting pre-meditation or planning,52 evidence of an unsavoury motive 
(e.g., sexual gratification, profit, or obstructing justice),53 brutality of killing 
(e.g., prolongation of harmful act, torture, et cetera),54 an accused’s history of 
dangerousness,55 or a lengthy parole ineligibility recommendation by a jury.56 As 
might be expected, there are relatively fewer cases in the highest end of the range, 
that is, in excess of twenty years.57
We have found nothing in the cases on parole ineligibility, however, to 
suggest any legitimate reason (and by “legitimate” we mean one that might form 
part of a reasoned judgment) for preferring a parole ineligibility period expressed 
in multiples of five, or in even numbers, or numbers rounded to the nearest 
whole number. No court has suggested, for instance, that fifteen years was chosen 
because it would be more effective as denunciation or deterrence than would be 
fourteen or sixteen years. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND DATA GATHERING
The data used in this article represent substantially all of the reported English-
language second-degree murder cases available on Quicklaw between January 1990 
and 31 December 2012.58 Cases were found by performing open-ended keyword 
searches of “murder” or “parole ineligibility.” The results were then examined with 
duplicate and irrelevant cases being removed. The data were further refined by 
removing cases that had been overturned or altered on appeal, in which case the 
51. Cruz, supra note 45; R v Perkin (1997), 98 BCAC 236, 161 WAC 236; R v Van Osselaer, 
2004 BCCA 3, 190 BCAC 313; Cerra, supra note 45; R v Guignard, 2008 ABQB 283, 447 
AR 376 [Guignard]; R v Macki, 2001 BCSC 417, 199 DLR (4th) 178.
52. R v Nash, 2009 NBCA 7, 340 NBR (2d) 320; R v Atwal, 2006 BCCA 493, 232 BCAC 64.
53. R v Faulds (1994), 20 OR (3d) 13, 79 OAC 313; R v Michelle (1998), BCJ no 1631 (QL), 
CarswellBC 1609 (CA).
54. R v Tsyganov (1998), 172 NSR (2d) 43, 42 WCB (2d) 197 (CA); R v Yaeck (1991), 6 OR 
(3d) 293, 50 OAC 29; R v Muise (1994), 135 NSR (2d) 81, 94 CCC (3d) 119 (CA).
55. R v Bennight, 2012 BCCA 190, 543 WAC 195.
56. Guignard, supra note 51; R v McInnis (1999), 44 OR (3d) 772, 134 CCC (3d) 515 (CA); R 
v Cousins (2000), 195 Nfld & PEIR 169, 47 WCB (2d) 94 (Nfld Sup Ct - TD); R v Price 
(1999), 42 WCB (2d) 106, [1999] BCJ no 812 (QL) (SC).
57. The authors found 66 out of 477 reported decisions since 1990 in which a parole ineligibility 
period of 20 years has been imposed.
58. The data only include English-language decisions outside of Quebec. The authors’ 
experience in searching Westlaw and CanLII was that QuickLaw captured all of the same 
available case law.
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appeal decision was substituted for that of the sentencing judge.59 In cases with 
more than one accused, the co-accuseds’ sentences were treated separately. The 
total sample resulted in 477 decisions. While this sample does not include every 
decision in Canada,60 it is considered large for statistical purposes and is, in any 
event, more likely to be representative of unreported decisions than might be the 
case with respect to lesser crimes.61 Thus, we have reason to believe that the cases 
we have found and included represent a significant body of the relevant decisions. 
We are aware of no basis to believe that our dataset is non-representative 
of parole ineligibility decisions generally.62 And of course, even if unreported 
decisions showed a different trend (or no trend at all) with respect to number 
preference, this would in no way assuage the concerns expressed in this article, 
but would instead only add another level of mystery. That is to say, if it turned 
out that unreported decisions did not show a bias for, for instance, even numbers, 
then the question might be: what is it about the process leading to, or the prospect 
of, reporting that brings the preference to the fore?
In fact, the process by which unreported decisions are usually made—joint 
submissions following a guilty plea—could shed further light on the operation 
of number preference. Do Crown counsel’s and defence lawyers’ joint proposals 
show the same biases as the database we have studied? Judges are generally not 
permitted to depart from a joint recommendation unless the proposed sentence 
is contrary to the public interest and would bring the administration of justice 
59. Only a very small number of appeals led to any variation in the sentencing, but it was 
important to our analysis that it considered the actual outcomes of cases, not simply the trial 
judges’ decisions: it is important to understand that the problem is not being ameliorated 
through the appeal process. 
60. Reported decisions tend to be those that follow a contested trial for murder. A large number 
of murder cases settle without a trial. In those cases, the parole ineligibility decision is 
generally not reported. As a consequence many, and possibly most, second-degree murder 
sentences are unreported in Quicklaw.
61. Given the nature of the consequence for a murder conviction, there tends to be a larger 
number of contested sentencing hearings and, consequently, a larger number of reported 
decisions. In addition, unlike most sentencing decisions, offenders have a statutory right of 
appeal against parole ineligibility decisions, and appellate decisions are always reported. See 
Criminal Code, supra note 2, s 675(2).
62. That is to say, the authors have no reason to believe that judges might be more swayed by 
number bias effects in cases that are more likely to be reported than in those which are not. 
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into disrepute.63 In those rare cases where judges do depart from the recommen-
dations, might they do so disproportionately when the proposal is not a preferred 
number? It might, therefore, be a useful future study if a database could be 
built (perhaps from Crown records) indicating the numbers proposed in joint 
submissions and implemented by the court.
C. CLUSTERING OF PAROLE INELIGIBILITY DECISIONS
In examining the data, we looked for three numerical preferences found in the 
literature: (i) a preference for multiples five and ten, (ii) a preference for even 
versus odd numbers, and (iii) a preference for whole numbers. We also observed 
a striking fourth preference for the number twelve. The results will be discussed, 
each in turn, in Part II(E), below. Figure 1 provides a graphic illustration of the 
overall data.64 
63.  R v Dorsey  (1999), 123 OAC 342, 43 WCB (2d) 273; R v Bezdan, 2001 BCCA 215, 
49 WCB (2d) 604; R v Fuller, 2007 BCCA 353 at para 17, 403 WAC 158. We note 
that there is some controversy as to the exact test permitting judges to depart from joint 
recommendations in British Columbia. See R v Roadhouse, 2012 BCCA 495 at paras 47-53, 
104 WCB (2d) 984. Nevertheless, judges are loathe to depart from joint submissions. 
64. We examined the data over five-year periods (1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, and 
2004-2009) and observed substantially identical clustering around 10, 12, 15, and 20 years 
in each period. One notable change has been an increased clustering around the 10-year 
mandatory minimum in the years between 1990 and 1994. We suggest that the pronounced 
change is likely attributable to the effect of the overruling of lower court decisions that 
established a soft legal presumption in favour of 10-year parole ineligibility periods. See 
Shropshire, supra note 3.
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FIGURE 1: PAROLE INELIGIBILITY DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTED CANADIAN 
DECISIONS BETWEEN 1990 AND 2012 (TOTAL NUMBER OF DECISIONS)
D. ANTICIPATED RATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PAROLE INELIGIBILITY 
Before saying more about the apparent “clustering”65 of parole ineligibility 
observable in the data, we want to say something about our implicit premise 
that the distribution of parole ineligibility periods would appear different in the 
absence of numerical bias. Of course, we did not begin our examination of the 
data with the notion that a distribution of parole ineligibility periods would be 
evenly spread from 10- through to 25-year periods. Indeed, the case law itself 
suggests, albeit weakly, that 10-year parole ineligibility periods should be more 
common than other periods.66 Also, since courts have held that periods in excess 
of 20 years are, and should be, relatively rare, it should come as no surprise 
that such sentences are less frequent. Overall, we would expect the graph to be 
generally downward-sloping as the ineligibility period increased. The difficulty in 
the data is not that periods of 20 years are less frequent than 12-, 14-, or 15-year 
65. “Clustering” can be defined as the grouping together or congestion of items. See e.g. Jason 
Mitchell, “Clustering and Psychological Barriers: The Importance of Numbers” (2001) 21 J 
Futures Markets 395.
66. Shropshire, supra note 3. That 10-year parole ineligibility periods should be more common 
than other periods, of course, is not borne out by the evidence from the reported cases. 
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periods. The question, then, is why a 20-year parole ineligibility period is so 
much more common than a 19- or 21-year period.
E. DISTRIBUTION IN THE DATA 
1. A PREFERENCE FOR MULTIPLES OF FIVE AND TEN
One of the first observable trends in the data presented in Figure 1 is an apparent 
preference for numbers involving multiples of 5 or 10, a phenomenon that is 
well-established in the literature.67 Of the 477 reported decisions nationwide, 
222—almost half—involved parole ineligibility periods ending with either 0 or 
5 (79 x 10, 93 x 15, 39 x 20, and 11 x 25). If the distribution were random, the 
expected frequency of such numbers would be one quarter or .25, yet the actual 
frequency is almost twice that: .465. 
This observed frequency suggests that as many as half of parole eligibility 
period decisions ending in 5 may have resulted in the rounding off of a number 
as opposed to a rational application of the statutory criteria for parole ineligi-
bility. Even assuming judges will round down as much as they will round up, 
this means that one quarter of those sentenced to, for instance, 15 years, would 
have received substantially lower sentences, in some cases years lower, absent the 
number bias. 
We should return again at this point to the question to which we earlier 
adverted: why should we expect a random distribution across the range? Apart 
from a direction from the SCC’s statement that 10 years would be the most 
common sentence,68 there is nothing in the legal criteria in section 745.4 of the 
Code that would provide a reason for favouring digits ending in 0 and 5, except 
that two of these numbers, 10 and 25, represent a “floor” and “ceiling” of the 
67. See Carlo G Camarda, Paul HC Eilers & Jutta Gampe, “Modelling general patterns of digit 
preference” (2008) 8:4 Statistical Modelling 385 (stating, “[A] commonly found effect is that 
certain preferred end-digits are reported substantially more often than the general pattern 
of distribution suggests. These digits are typically multiples of 5 and 10, possibly combined 
with tendencies to avoid certain unpleasant numbers like, e.g. 13”). The authors note that 
this leads to “heapings” at the preferred digits. See also Shi Wu Wen et al, “Terminal Digit 
Preference, Random Error, and Bias in Routine Clinical Measurement of Blood Pressure” 
(1993) 46:10 J Clin Epidemiol 1187; Robert J Myers, “Errors and Bias in the Reporting of 
Ages in Census Data” (1940) 41 Transactions – Actuarial Society of America 395; Prithwis 
das Gupta, “A General Method of Correction for Age Misreporting in Census Populations” 
(1975) 12:2 Demography 303; Daniel F Heitjan & Donald B Rubin, “Inference from 
Coarse Data Via Multiple Imputation with Application to Age Heaping” (1990) 85:410 J 
Am Statistical Assoc 304; See Rowland, supra note 39.
68. Shropshire, supra note 3. 
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range, and thus might be preferred as including those cases that might otherwise 
fall above or below it. 
So what if we assume that there is a good explanation for clustering or 
heaping at 10 years and 25 years, and exclude those numbers from the analysis? 
We are then left with a dataset of 387 decisions in the remaining 14 whole digits. 
If the decisions were free of digit preference, we would expect around 55 decisions 
to fall on 15 or 20 years (.143); instead we see that 132 do (.340). What should 
be a frequency of 1/7 is 1/3. And, of course, a quick glance at Figure 1, above, 
shows that the preference for these numbers cannot be explained simply because 
they are in a particularly appropriate range. If that were so, we would expect 14 
and 16 also to be significantly favoured. Instead, those numbers together occur 
only two-thirds as often as does 15. We would suggest, in this regard, that if 15 
really were the most legally appropriate number in a greater number of cases, and 
not simply a preferred digit, the next most legally appropriate numbers should 
be those closest to it.69 
2. A PREFERENCE FOR EVEN NUMBERS
As discussed above, the psychological literature indicates that, in addition to 
preferring numbers ending with 0 and 5, humans (at least Western humans) also 
tend to prefer even numbers over odd.70 So a second review of the data can be 
performed to see if this preference is exhibited in the parole ineligibility context. 
If sub-rational thought processes are influencing judges’ decisions, this should be 
apparent in a disproportionately high number of even-numbered periods versus 
odd.
And this is exactly what we observed in the 477 decisions recorded in our 
data. We can first look at all the parole ineligibility periods between 10 and 25 
years, which yields a total of 470 decisions (excluding the seven decisions that fall 
between whole numbers) consisting of eight even-numbered (10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 
69. Focusing on the range around 15 years (e.g., 13-17) where a total of 208 of the decisions fall, 
we would expect each year to be imposed one fifth of the time (i.e., .20)—in other words, 
in 41 to 42 decisions. Instead, of the digits in that range, only 14 occurs an average amount 
of the time. The others occur at about half of the expected frequency, where 15 occurs over 
twice that.
70. Terence M Hines, “An odd effect: Lengthened reaction times for judgments about odd digits” 
(1990) 18:1 Memory & Cognition 40. Hines found that an even response was systematically 
faster than an odd response, a difference that he attributed to the linguistic markedness of the 
“odd concept.” See also Yutaka Nishiyama, “A Study of Odd- and Even-Number Cultures” 
(2006) 26:6 Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 479.
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20, 22, and 24) and eight odd-numbered ineligibility periods (11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 
21, 23, and 25) between 10 and 25. 
One might expect that the decisions, if premised solely on the legal criteria, 
should be split more or less equally between even and odd. However, as Figure 2, 
below, demonstrates, we do not observe anything like an equal split. In fact, 292 
decisions, or 62 per cent of the sampled cases, involve a period of parole ineligi-
bility with an even-numbered year. Moreover, if we exclude years ending in 0 or 5 
in order to eliminate the spikes at 10 and 25 (the floor and ceiling) and at 15 and 
20 (which may be the result of a separate rounding process), the results are even 
more stark: there are 174 decisions (70 per cent) with parole ineligibility periods 
using even numbers and only 74 decisions with odd numbers. In other words, 
it appears that judges who do not impose a sentence in multiples of five are over 
twice as likely to impose even-numbered ineligibility periods as odd ones.
FIGURE 2: EVEN VERSUS ODD NUMBERED PAROLE INELIGIBILITY DECISIONS 
BETWEEN 1990 AND 2012 (TOTAL NUMBER OF REPORTED CANADIAN DECISIONS)
3. A PREFERENCE FOR WHOLE NUMBERS
A less surprising result from the data is the apparent judicial preference to impose 
parole ineligibility periods on whole-numbered years. It is difficult to conceive 
of any legal reason why judges should prefer custodial terms of imprisonment of 
(2014) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL128
an entire year versus lesser increments. Indeed, such lesser increments are used 
frequently by judges when imposing sentences in respect of other offences.71 
We see from the data that at least some judges (six, in fact) have imposed 
terms of 12.5, 13.5, 18.5, or 19.5 years.72 The rest, however, appear to have 
restricted themselves to ineligibility periods in one-year increments. It is striking 
that out of 477 reported decisions there are only six reported decisions in which a 
judge ordered a parole ineligibility period with an increment between two whole-
numbered years. 
It is important not to make too much of this level of rounding. There may be 
reasons other than a heuristic preference for whole numbers over fractional years. 
It might be, for instance, that a period of 13.5 years rather than 13 or 14 years 
would require a more exacting analysis on the part of the sentencing judge in 
order to make the implied precision appear justified, and such an exercise might 
appear artificial in a decision that is, as we suggested earlier, more an art than 
a science. But while this reason might explain the phenomenon, it should still 
cause at least some unease as we remind ourselves that, if rounding is taking place 
in these circumstances, those murderers whose periods are not being rounded to 
the nearest 5 or 2 might still be serving up to six months too long, or up to six 
months too little. When weighed against a life sentence, this might appear trivial. 
However, if one imagines spending six months in a penitentiary, the gravity is 
more apparent.
4. A PREFERENCE FOR THE NUMBER TWELVE
One other fact apparent from Figure 1 is a strong preference for the number 12. 
We found in reviewing the data that the spike at 12 years is apparent province by 
province, and also over time. Twelve is usually the third most popular number 
71. A good example is manslaughter, where a small sample reveals that half-year sentence 
increments are relatively common. See R v C(SD), 2013 ABCA 46, 556 AR 27 (7.5 years); R 
v Brian (1998), 131 Man R (2d) 149, 40 WCB (2d) 374 (CA) (10.5 reduced to 7.5 years); 
R v St-Cyr, 2012 ONSC 887, [2012] OJ no 1956 (QL) (7.5 years); R v Abel, 2008 BCSC 
1731, 81 WCB (2d) 99 (8.5 years); R v Bakker, 2003 BCSC 982, 62 WCB (2d) 317 (8.5 
years); R v Dingwell, 2012 PESC 13, 321 Nfld & PEIR 263 (5.5 years); R v Gilling, [2001] 
OJ no 2300 (QL) (Ont CA) (5.5 years); R v Hathway, 2008 SKQB 480, 80 WCB (2d) 189 
(11.5 years); R v Ma, 2010 ONSC 4803, 89 WCB (2d) 699 (9.5 years).  
72. R v Nichols, [2006] OJ no 2868 (QL) (Ont Sup Ct J); R v Feeley (2001), 55 OR (3d) 
481, 156 CCC (3d) 449 (CA); R v JRG, [2002] OJ no 5687 (QL) (Ont Sup Ct J); R v 
Knott, [2005] OJ no 3834 (QL) (where trial judge observed that more culpable co-accused 
Kakegamic received a parole ineligibility period of 13.5 years whereas Knott received a parole 
ineligibility period of 11 years); R v Ward, 2011 NSCA 78, 307 NSR (2d) 216; R v Assoun 
(1999), 182 NSR (2d) 344, [1999] NSJ no 479 (QL) (SC).
JONES & RANKIN, JUSTICE AS A ROUNDING ERROR? 129
(after 15 and 10), but is sometimes second after 15 (in the period 2001–2005). 
And, indeed, in the most recent period, 12 was the single most popular number 
nationally.73 This was borne out in a statistical analysis as well. On a purely 
random basis, a 12-year period would be expected to appear in 6.7 per cent of 
cases. However, the sample shows that more than 12 per cent of cases result in a 
12-year parole ineligibility period (p = .0182).
Preference for particular numbers has been measured in other contexts.74 
Also, certain numbers were in many societies historically imbued with cultural 
significance and symbolism, which might affect preference.75 In this case, the 
strength of the apparent preference for 12 requires that we at least speculate as to 
its cause, or, perhaps more likely, causes. Twelve has the dual advantage of being 
an even number and one at the lower end of the range where most of the decisions 
occur. It is close to 10, the baseline, and therefore may also benefit from the 
“baseline anchoring effect,” whereby sentences will skew towards a number given 
as the starting point for the analysis.76 Twelve is also arguably an independently 
pleasing and “available” number, and like 10 is a frequent counting multiple (an 
even dozen). Furthermore, it may be that 12 provides a convenient “middle of 
the range” between 10 and 15 which avoids the number 13, with its attendant 
negative cultural symbolism. In our view, the preference for 12 may be explained 
by some combination of these and, perhaps, other factors.
Whatever the explanation, it does not appear to us to be the result of a 
rational and reasoned application of criteria in section 745(c) of the Code. 
As with 15, if it were the product of a rational or reasoned process we would 
expect a greater number of sentences in the adjacent numbers (in this case 
73. A preference for 12 does not, on its own, account for the overall preference for even 
numbers, which remains when 12 is removed from the calculation. If we only examine the 
decisions imposing periods of 13 years and longer, and exclude again 15, 20, and 25, we are 
left with five even and five odd numbers. In these data, even numbers outnumber odd ones 
103 to 66.
74. For instance, it has long been demonstrated that about 30 per cent of people—at least in 
Europe and America—asked to produce a random number between 0 and 9 will choose 7. 
See William E Simon, “Number and Color Responses of Some College Students: Preliminary 
Evidence for a “Blue Seven Phenomenon” (1971) 33 Perceptual & Motor Skills 373; Michael 
Kubovy & Joseph Psotka, “The Predominance of Seven and the Apparent Spontaneity 
of Numerical Choices” (1976) 2:2 J Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & 
Performance 291.
75. See e.g. Camarda, Eilers & Gampe, supra note 65. They note that numerical preferences for 
numbers such as 0 and 5 may be “combined with tendencies to avoid certain unpleasant 
numbers” such as 13. See also Mitchell, supra note 65.
76. See generally Isaacs, supra note 14.
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11 and 13), which is not present. It appears, therefore, that many judges are 
subconsciously rounding to 12 in the same way others are rounding to 15 or to 
the nearest even number.
5. STATISTICAL ANALYSES
We subjected our data to a number of common statistical tests in order to 
evaluate whether the observed distribution could be explained by random 
chance.77 Using a Normal Distribution Goodness of Fit Test with an expected 
frequency for each 10 per cent interval of the data, the hypothesis that the data 
was normally distributed was rejected (p < .005), meaning that there is only a 0.5 
per cent likelihood that the results observed could be explained by chance. The 
data were also tested using the Poisson Distribution Goodness of Fit Test. The 
results indicated that the data did not have a Poisson distribution and that there 
was only a 0.5 per cent likelihood that the results observed could be explained 
by chance.
In addition to the broad distribution tests, the data were subject to a number 
of population proportion hypothesis tests. No matter what method was employed, 
there appeared to be little prospect that the results were simply chance. Indeed, 
each test confirmed that there was some factor at play influencing the selection 
of particular numbers over others, inexplicable by reference to the legal factors 
enumerated in the Code or suggested in the judgments themselves.
In sum, using a purely statistical method, the data supported our conclusion 
that judges have a hidden tendency to choose parole ineligibility terms that are 
even numbered, involve full years, or are a multiple of five years. Given the size of 
the sample, we also consider it possible to extrapolate that second-degree murder 
trials outside of this sample would result in the same trends. 
6. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CLUSTERING EFFECT
As discussed in Part II(E)(1)-(2), above, it may be possible to explain certain 
preferences because they represent the floor and ceiling of the range and therefore 
might include sentences that would have been lower or higher, respectively, but 
for the legislative mandates. However, we have also suggested that this does not 
explain the preference for 20 or, most particularly, the strong, indeed dominant, 
clustering at 15.
77. The level of significance used for all tests was p = .05.
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One possibility is that judges might favour 15 years because, until 2011, that 
number represented the “faint hope clause” threshold.78 That is, for the period 
covered by the data, persons convicted of second-degree murder who had been 
sentenced to periods of parole ineligibility greater than 15 years could, after 
15 years, apply to have the ineligibility period reduced. A judge sentencing a 
convicted murderer could, arguably, have rationally rounded down a sentence of 
marginally more than 15 years to that number, to avert the social costs associated 
with a “faint hope” hearing and determination. It is also possible, that the faint 
hope threshold of 15 years exerted another type of influence, that of providing a 
heuristic “anchor” and triggering a biased result.79
While these observations might provide an explanation that does not involve 
a sub-rational preference for numbers rounded to the nearest 5, they are no 
less unsatisfactory from a legal point of view. This is so because the faint hope 
threshold was never among the factors that the courts could legitimately have 
considered in assessing parole ineligibility (which included only “the character 
of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding 
its commission, and to the recommendation, if any, made pursuant to section 
745.2”80). In addition, we are aware of no decision in which a court imposing a 
15-year period justified any preference for that number on any basis except the 
accepted legal criteria as applied to the facts of the case. 
Moreover, there appears to be no similar explanation for the clear preference 
the data show with respect to even numbers, whole numbers, or for the number 
12. As we have conceded, rounding to the nearest whole number might be 
excused because, after all, there can never be perfect precision in sentencing 
and there has to be some basic gradient. But given the availability of half-year 
increments (demonstrated by the fact that at least seven judges chose them), 
and given the high importance assigned by society to even brief periods of 
incarceration, it is surprising that they were utilized in just over one per cent 
of cases. 
78. On 2 December 2011, the Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple 
Murders Act (Bill C-48) came into force and abolished the faint hope clause. Persons 
convicted of murder must now serve their entire period of parole ineligibility before applying 
for parole. See Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple Murders Act, 
SC 2011, c 5.
79. “Anchoring” is the phenomenon, discussed at greater length in Part I(B), above, by which 
an unrelated number can exert a strong influence over a quantitative choice. As the authors 
noted, anchoring has been studied exhaustively, and persuasively demonstrated in the judicial 
context.
80. Criminal Code, supra note 2, s 745.4.
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Although this article suggests that the phenomenon we have identified arises 
from the preferences and biases of sentencing judges, it must be admitted that 
other system participants’ preferences may also have an influence. For instance, 
it is reasonable to assume that counsel would share the judges’ biases, and so 
their submissions to the court regarding the appropriate period of ineligibility 
would similarly favour rounded numbers. Indeed, such submissions may have 
considerable influence on the judges, through the operation of the anchoring 
heuristic described earlier. And, if it is true that some numbers seem intuitively 
more satisfying due to the preference heuristic, then it could also be postulated 
that sentences rounded to those numbers are more likely to be accepted and less 
likely to be appealed, and if appealed they would be more likely to be upheld.
Another explanation for the clustering effect that has been suggested to us 
is that lawyers and judges are relying upon precedent.81 Because past sentences 
have been 10, 12, 15, or 20 years, or have disproportionately favoured even 
numbers, subsequent decisions may be simply reinforcing an established pattern. 
An adhesion to precedent numbers may indeed be a factor in sentencing, but 
it provides no comfort to those concerned that the numbers themselves are not 
rationally derived. Why was the pattern established in the first place? Even if 
precedent influenced a continuing pattern—which it likely does—there must 
have been some reason for the initial clustering around certain numbers. Indeed, 
it would be doubly concerning if preferences that were initially established 
through heuristic mechanisms were continued through the addition of blind 
adherence to what is likely a recurrent bias. (There is no reason to suppose that 
whatever biases caused the initial pattern to be established would have somehow 
disappeared in the meantime, with only their precedential ‘shadows’ remaining.) 
The explanation of number preference as a manifestation of adherence to 
precedent is also difficult to accept in light of how little emphasis is placed 
in the jurisprudence on precedent numbers. Appellate courts have been 
reluctant to establish fixed ranges for second-degree murder sentences, let alone 
81. The authors would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers of this piece for suggesting 
this explanation. 
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particular numbers.82 Indeed, in R v Shropshire, the Court expressly rejected 
the notion that there should be a rebuttable presumption in favour of the 
10-year minimum for parole ineligibility.83 To our knowledge, only the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal has posited the notion that there are groupings of 
cases by 10–15 years or 15–20 years, but even that court has not identified 
any particular favoured numbers within that range.84 And in any event, the 
clustering of parole ineligibility decisions in British Columbia follows the same 
pattern that is visible in other provinces. 
A further explanation that might be offered to explain the clustering 
observed in our data turns on how judges may normatively characterize the 
relative heinousness of a murder.85 This explanation rests, in part, on a rejection 
of the assumption that there would be an expected distribution that would evenly 
spread sentences from 10 to 25 years in the absence of any number bias. Instead, 
this explanation posits that judges have tacitly adopted sentencing categories, 
perhaps differentiating between offenders who are more or less dangerous or 
morally culpable, and then placing those offenders on the high, moderate, or low 
end of those variables. If this were so, then there would be a clustering around 
only five or six numbers, not the thirty categories that our expected distribution 
assumes. As with precedent, there may be something to this explanation. (But also 
as with precedent, it provides little comfort in that it replaces one non-rational, 
or sub-rational, explanation with another.) However, we would clarify that it is 
not our contention that in the absence of any number preference there would be 
no clustering whatsoever, or that there would necessarily be an even distribution 
from 10 to 25 years. 
Our purpose is not to suggest that there is a departure from an expected 
distribution, but rather, to explain why the clustering occurs at certain numerical 
intervals and not others. Indeed, even if there were fewer possible variations in 
sentences, this still does not explain why the clustering occurs at 10, 12, 15, or 
82. The courts’ posture is somewhat anomalous when compared with sentencing for other 
offences. Although sentencing judges are not strictly bound by the ranges that emerge from 
the case law, the SCC has often emphasized that a sentencing judge’s discretion has limits 
and that it “is fettered in part by the case law that has set down, in some circumstances, 
general ranges of sentences for particular offences… .” According to the Court, the effect 
of this is “to encourage greater consistency between sentencing decisions in accordance 
with the principle of parity enshrined in the Code.” See R v Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 at 
para 44, [2010] 1 SCR 206. 
83. Shropshire, supra note 3. 
84. Cerra, supra note 46. 
85. The authors would again like to thank one of the three anonymous reviewers of this piece for 
suggesting this alternative explanation. 
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20 years, and not, for instance, 10.5, 11, 16, or 19 years. Thus, while it may be 
true (and likely is to some extent) that there are a limited number of variables 
that influence a judge’s perception of the offender, this does not explain why 
the clustering occurs where it does. Our claim is only that the clustering around 
certain numbers arises because of a subconscious bias in favour of those numbers 
(shared as a common tendency among judges), not that the expected distribution 
would be evenly spread in the absence of this bias.
III. THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF SUB-RATIONAL BIAS 
IN SETTING PAROLE INELIGIBILITY 
If we accept that this judicial rounding is taking place, the question that arises 
from our conclusions is: Does it matter? The answer to this question, in our view, 
depends to a large extent on one’s understanding of the nature and purposes of 
adjudication and punishment. As we discussed above, the Canadian sentencing 
regime, as principally articulated in sections 718 and 718.1 of the Code, sets 
out a number of principles and objectives, including denunciation, deterrence, 
separation, restoration, reparation, and rehabilitation.86 These more specific 
sentencing objectives must be considered in the context of our more general 
commitments to adjudicative decision-making as a form of social ordering. 
On one argument, a cognitive preference for rounding may be justifiable on 
its own terms: if rounded or even numbers are more intuitively satisfying to the 
sentencing judge, they are presumably also more satisfying to members of the 
public. Perhaps then, a parole ineligibility period of 12 or 15 years actually better 
fulfills some of the social objectives of sentencing (such as denunciation and the 
satisfaction of retributive and punitive impulses) than would 13 or 17, precisely 
because the citizenry shares the same heuristic as judges. The public mind, on this 
argument, would be jarred by unpleasing numbers, and so making such decisions 
more accurate does not necessarily improve them. A variation on this argument 
might suggest that because system participants—lawyers and offenders as well 
as judges—are more satisfied with preferred-number sentences, such sentences 
are less likely to be appealed, and less likely to be overturned on appeal. Again, 
this explanation provides a plausible mechanism for the reinforcement, and 
perhaps even magnification, of the number preference effect, but it does nothing 
to assuage the central concern that the sentences are not being derived from a 
rational application of judgment to the facts of each case.
86. Criminal Code, supra note 2, ss 718, 718.1. 
JONES & RANKIN, JUSTICE AS A ROUNDING ERROR? 135
The combination of the impact on individual liberty and the increased 
social costs produced by judgments must weigh more heavily than any advantage 
gained by pandering to instinctive and irrational biases. As we described above, 
the parole ineligibility provisions of the Code are an anomalous feature of the 
Canadian criminal justice system. More particularly, they tilt decidedly in favour 
of denunciation over the restorative and rehabilitative aims of ordinary criminal 
sentencing. Given that the sentence for all murders is life imprisonment,87 an 
extended period of parole ineligibility imposed in advance by a court can have 
only one meaningful effect: it keeps a person in prison who would otherwise, 
under the ordinary rules, be released. That is to say, an offender must remain in 
prison even where a person would not “present an undue risk to society” and even 
where his release “will contribute to the protection of society by facilitating the 
reintegration of the offender into society as a law-abiding citizen.”88 
Although it is sometimes suggested that parole ineligibility (to the extent 
that it provides for incarceration beyond the time when an offender would 
otherwise have been released) serves the interests of victims’ families89 or acts as 
some additional deterrence,90 it seems to us that parole ineligibility is largely, if 
not completely, punishment for the sake of punishment, directed at satisfying 
a real or perceived social desire for denunciation or for separating an offender 
from society. If parole ineligibility is, as it appears to be, based on such a dubious, 
or at least highly contestable, penological theory,91 we maintain that special 
87. Criminal Code, supra note 2, s 745. 
88. See e.g. Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 2, s 102 [CCRA].
89. The argument here is that a minimum period of parole ineligibility relieves victims’ families 
of appearing at hearings to oppose release, and provides them with a set and certain period 
of peace and recovery. See e.g. Conservative Party of Canada, News Release, Supporting 
Victims’ Rights (25 April 2013), online: <http://www.conservative.ca/supporting-victims-
rights> (endorsing increases in parole ineligibility for certain crimes because “victims and 
their families still must attend unnecessary parole hearings that force them to relive their 
experiences”).
90. It is now so widely acknowledged that deterrence is largely unaffected by the availability 
of a sentence that it is hard to imagine a deterrent effect. Indeed, this is doubly so when 
the offence in question is already subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of life 
imprisonment. See Daniel S Nagin, “Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of 
the Twenty-First Century” in Michael Tonry, ed, Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); PH Robinson & John M Darley, “Does 
Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation” (2004) 24:2 Oxford J Legal Stud 
173; Kevin C Kennedy, “A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory” (1983-1984) 
88 Dick L Rev 1.
91. RA Duff, “Responsibility, Restoration and Retribution” in Michael Tonry, ed, Retributivism 
Has a Past: Has it a Future? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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vigilance is justified to ensure that the decisions are being made through the 
reasoned application of the statutory criteria to the facts of each case. A careful 
and restrained approach also sits more easily with the value placed upon liberty 
and the idea of restraint in punishment that finds voice in many of the rights 
enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.92 
This is even more important given that each day, week, month, or year of a 
parole ineligibility period represents an actual deprivation of liberty for that full 
period. For other criminal offences, an offender becomes eligible for parole after 
he has served a period of ineligibility of the lesser of one-third of the sentence and 
seven years.93 Consequently, with most offences, especially more serious ones, an 
additional month or year of sentence may not actually involve a significant increase 
in actual imprisonment. It follows, then, that assessments of parole ineligibility 
should be, if anything, more rigorous than for sentencing of other crimes. 
There are other reasons to err in favour of more rational and measured parole 
ineligibility decisions, perhaps not least of which is the very real direct financial 
costs associated with longer periods of incarceration. According to Corrections 
Canada, the “annual average cost of keeping a federal inmate behind bars has 
increased from $88,000 in 2005-06 to over $113,000 in 2009-10.”94 It costs 
approximately $300 a day to maintain a male inmate. This cost rises to “$578 per 
92. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, 
c 11 [Charter]. This is most obviously protected by the prohibition in s 12 of the Charter 
on “cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.” However, principles of restraint in 
punishment are also provided by s 11(g), which protects against retroactive punishment, and 
s 11(i), which requires that an individual be given the benefit of the lesser of two potential 
punishments when there has been a variation between the time of the commission of the 
offence and sentencing. However, s 7 of the Charter also protects a number of hearing rights 
in the context of sentencing. See e.g. R v Lyons, [1987] 2 SCR 309 at para 85, 44 DLR (4th) 
193.
93. CCRA, supra note 88, s 120. The system of parole eligibility is somewhat byzantine and varies 
for certain offences. However, this represents the general rule. 
94. Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional 
Investigator 2011-2012, online: <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/annrpt/
annrpt20112012-eng.aspx>.
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day to incarcerate a federally sentenced woman inmate.”95 By contrast, “the annual 
average cost to keep an offender in the community is about $29,500.”96
It is true, of course, that rounding may also save costs—that is, a court may 
be just as likely to round down as it is to round up. Indeed, the data that we 
have examined could be interpreted as suggesting that rounding down might be 
somewhat more prevalent than rounding up, at least with respect to the clusters 
around 15 and 20.97 Assuming that a criminal defendant faces an equal prospect 
of a sentence that is either too high or too low, it might be argued that he or she 
is probabilistically no worse off from the inaccuracy: the offender is equally likely 
to benefit from the rounding, and be released “earlier” than he should, as to 
suffer the deprivation of additional months or years in prison. On this probabi-
listic argument, the harm is a “wash.” But assuming that there is some purpose to 
the period of parole ineligibility—be it denunciation, deterrence, or protection 
of society from re-offence98—then an irrationally low ineligibility period might 
impose social costs and create risks no less than might an irrationally high one. 
Moreover, even in these circumstances of equal probability of “too high” 
and “too low” periods, we would argue that there is an inherent unfairness in 
sentences that are based on sub-rational reasoning processes that do not depend 
upon the statutory criteria for assessing ineligibility periods. It is a well-accepted 
principle in our system of criminal law that over-incarceration involves more 
social costs than under-incarceration, a principle that is echoed in William 
Blackstone’s famous maxim that it is “better that ten guilty persons escape, than 
95. Ibid. 
96. Ibid. We refrain from tendering an opinion on whether costs of incarceration are costs worth 
bearing. Our point here is that if they are worth bearing, it must be for some better reason 
than a judge’s sub-rational bias in favour of a particular number. As this article suggests, our 
purpose is not so much to advocate for reduced parole ineligibility—indeed, the data may 
theoretically be interpreted as suggesting the need for higher periods of parole ineligibly—but 
to point to the need for a more careful exercise of discretion. Although the SCC has found 
it to be inappropriate for sentencing judges to engage in a “cost/benefit budgetary analysis” 
when setting parole ineligibility, we maintain that judges should be concerned about 
permitting subconscious preferences to lead them to impose sentences that result in the 
unnecessary expenditure of tax dollars. See e.g. Shropshire, supra note 3 at 20.
97. One can observe, for instance, that there are considerably more decisions in the 13-14 year 
range than in the 16-17 year range, although this may be partially or fully explained by the 
general slope of the graph (with lower sentences generally more common than higher).
98. Although this factor is not explicit in the Code, we consider it to be somewhat implied in the 
direction that the court consider “the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and 
the circumstances surrounding its commission, and to the recommendation, if any, made 
pursuant to section 745.2.” See Criminal Code, supra note 2 s 745.4.
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that one innocent suffer.”99 This notion is central to Western moral philosophy100 
and has also been defended on economic grounds.101 In differentiating these 
social costs, contemporary scholars have drawn a distinction between Type I 
errors (which occur when an innocent person is convicted) and Type II errors 
(which occur when a guilty person is set free). Although the matter is not without 
controversy,102 the general consensus seems to be that the costs of Type I errors 
(the injustice of wrongful conviction) are so great as to outweigh by several times 
the costs associated with Type II errors (the risk borne by society of permitting a 
guilty party to escape punishment).103 
In our case, a defendant facing an irrationally long sentence is not “innocent”—
he is still as much a criminal after the ineligibility period has expired as before: 
the sentence is, after all, for life. So it may be that we are willing to tolerate the 
further imprisonment of guilty people for sub-rational reasons more so than we 
would be willing to tolerate the even brief incarceration of the factually innocent. 
In other words, we may not have any equivalent Blackstonian principle saying 
that “it is better that 10 murderers receive sentences too short than that one 
receive a sentence too long.” But even if this were so, it would be disappointing 
if the rounding phenomenon we have identified were considered irrelevant—if 
we as a society were equally untroubled by a rehabilitated prisoner remaining in 
prison too long as we were by an un-rehabilitated prisoner remaining there for a 
period that was too short.
There is one final dimension to our normative analysis that warrants 
comment, and this is the implication of heuristic decision-making for the 
99. Commentaries on the Law of England, vol 4 (New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, 2003) at 
352.
100. Isaacs quotes a number of variations of Blackstone’s maxim, including the Biblical story of 
Sodom, where God agreed to allow the sinners of the city to go unpunished if destroying 
Sodom would mean that even 10 innocents were killed. See Isaacs, supra note 14 at 455-56.
101. Richard A Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2001) at 366.
102. Indeed Louis Kaplow has suggested that “fixat[ing]” on the Blackstone formulation is itself 
the result of cognitive errors including framing effects. See Louis Kaplow, “Burden of Proof” 
(2012) 121:4 Yale LJ 738 at 803, n 112. Kaplow’s argument is based on work by Larry 
Laudan, who suggested that the “Blackstone ratio” takes insufficient account of the harm 
avoided by incarceration, because the chances of being a victim of violent crime are “orders 
of magnitude higher than the likelihood of being falsely convicted.” See Larry Laudan, “The 
Rules of Trial, Political Morality, and the Costs of Error: Or, Is Proof Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt Doing More Harm than Good?” in Leslie Green & Brian Leiter, eds, Oxford Studies 
in Philosophy of Law, vol 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 195 at 199-200.
103. Alexander Volokh, “Guilty Men” (1997) 146:2 U Pa L Rev 173 (comparing various 
iterations of the Blackstone ratio).
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legitimacy of adjudication more generally, as a form of social ordering. Lon 
Fuller has described adjudication as especially authoritative precisely because it 
purports to be a reasoned and rational process. As Fuller explains, adjudication 
is “a device which gives formal and institutional expression to the influence of 
reasoned argument in human affairs. As such it assumes a burden of rationality 
not borne by any other form of social ordering… .”104 Indeed, the Privy Council 
once considered judgments made under the authority of a Tasmanian statute 
which explicitly permitted judges to disregard rules of law and equity when 
reaching certain decisions to not be judicial decisions at all, and hence unconsti-
tutional.105 On this view, heuristic decision-making should be anathema to 
adjudication precisely because it is at odds with the very notion that judges 
must engage in a deliberative and rational process when rendering a decision. 
Needless to say, if courts’ decisions are demonstrably not rational, or at least are 
not reasoned, public confidence in the judicial system, already unsteady, cannot 
help but be diminished. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS
This study suggests that there is a realistic possibility that judges are imposing 
sentences influenced by a heuristic that leads them to select periods of parole 
ineligibility based upon sub-rational preferences for certain numbers: even 
numbers, multiples of 5, and the number 12. While an alternative explanation is 
possible, the clustering effect itself is plain. And because the clear preference for 
clustering numbers appears to be entirely unrelated to the enumerated criteria in 
the Code, it is difficult to conceive of an alternative explanation for the data that 
would prove satisfying.  
Our findings support the growing body of research demonstrating the 
stubborn strength of heuristics in the judicial context. Stubborn, but not 
immutable: as we observed earlier in this article, it is generally thought possible 
for our deliberative cognitive processes to override our intuitive brain. In 1930, 
the great American judge Jerome Frank wrote reflectively of subconscious 
biases in the judicial decision-making process. Frank described judgments as 
104. Fuller’s view is that “[we] demand of an adjudicative decision a kind of rationality … 
This higher responsibility toward rationality is at once the strength and the weakness of 
adjudication as a form of social ordering.” See Lon L Fuller & Kenneth I Winston, “The 
Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92:2 Harv L Rev 353 at 366-67 [emphasis in 
original].
105. Moses v Parker, [1896] AC 245, 65 LJPC 18.
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proceeding from subconsciously-biased “hunch” to disingenuous rationalization, 
a progression which could resemble “judicial somnambulism.”106 According to 
Frank, rigorous self-awareness was required to improve decisions:107
Unfortunately, most judges … are not even aware that they are not aware. Judges 
Holmes, Cardozo, Hand, Hutcheson, Lehman and a few others have attained the 
enlightened state of awareness of their unawareness. A handful of legal thinkers off 
the bench have likewise come to the point of noting the ignorance of all of us as to 
just how decisions judicial or otherwise, are reached. Until many more lawyers and 
judges become willing to admit that ignorance which is the beginning of wisdom 
and from that beginning work forward painstakingly and consciously, we shall get 
little real enlightenment on that subject.
Our research was limited to parole ineligibility decisions, a uniquely quanti-
fiable, comparable, and readily available dataset. Whether the number-preference 
heuristic is more broadly at work in the sentencing system is uncertain, but it 
seems reasonable to suppose that the considerable discretion conferred upon 
sentencing judges might make “ordinary” sentencing at least as susceptible to the 
influence of sub-rational preferences for certain numbers, and perhaps more so.108 
But the significance of our demonstration, and the other studies highlighting the 
influence of subconscious biases, is broader still. Taken together, the burgeoning 
literature represents an invitation, particularly to judges, to become more aware 
of the influence that heuristics may have on the adjudicative process, to develop 
what Frank called an “awareness of their unawareness” in the interest of more 
accurate—and more just—judgments.  
106. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (NewYork: Doubleday,1930) at 157.
107. Ibid at 164. 
108. This should not, however, be taken as a recommendation in favour of legislated sentencing 
guidelines. There is, after all, no reason to suppose that legislators’ sentences would be any 
more accurate than judges,’ and all the reason in the world to suppose that they would be less 
so, given that legislators act entirely in the absence of the adjudicative facts of a given case.
